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ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL AVIATION




IN 1490 LEONARDO DA VINCI first designed a flying
machine. Over three hundred fifty years later, in 1842,
William S. Henson patented a design for a steam-powered
airplane.' Another sixty years passed before Orville
Wright piloted the first successful airplane in 1903.2 In
1910 Edouard Nieuport flew the first airplane with an en-
closed fuselage and in the same year John McCurdy sent
and received radio messages from an airplane.3 Four
years later, only eleven years after Orville Wright's first
flight, Tony Jannus piloted the first airline flight.4 In
1936 Lockheed built the first pressurized cabin airplane
and Douglas aircraft introduced the DC-3.5 In 1939 Ger-
many flew the first successful jet airplane and in 1952
British Overseas Airways began the first regularly sched-
uled jet airliner service.6
Although these dates represent important progress in
aviation technology, not all progress in the field is techno-
logical. On August 23, 1958, Congress passed the Federal
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Aviation Act of 1958.7 This act has had a tremendous im-
pact on aviation in the United States and the world. Prob-
ably one of the greatest effects of the Act resulted from its
creation of the Federal Aviation Agency.8 The Federal
Aviation Act directed the Federal Aviation Agency to pre-
scribe rules for air traffic and the Agency responded by
creating the Federal Aviation Regulations. 9
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) enforcement of
Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs) creates controversy
in several areas and there is no shortage of commentary
on the subject.10 Disagreement exists among the com-
mentators about the various advantages and disadvan-
tages of the FAA's enforcement policies and procedures."
This comment will first attempt to outline the steps and
procedures followed in FAA enforcement actions, point-
? Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 1958 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 855, 946. For a short history of the regulation of aviation see Ham-
ilton, Appellate Practice in Air Safety Proceedings, 10 Sw. U.L. REv. 247-50 (1978).
0 Federal Aviation Act of 1958 § 301, 1958 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
885, 870. The Federal Aviation Agency is now the Federal Aviation
Administration.
t, Federal Aviation Act of 1958 § 307(c), 1958 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws
877. Section 307(c) reads:
The Administrator is further authorized and directed to prescribe air
traffic rules and regulations governing the flight of aircraft, for the
navigation, protection, and identification of aircraft, for the protec-
tion of persons and property on the grounds, and for the efficient
utilization of the navigable airspace, including rules as to safe alti-
tudes of flight and rules for the prevention of collision between air-
craft, between aircraft and land or water vehicles, and between
aircraft and airborne objects.
Id.
The Federal Aviation Regulations are found in Title 14 of the Code of Federal
Regulations. The regulations applicable to the topic of this comment are found in
Chapters I and II of that title, which include 14 C.F.R. Part 1-399 (1987).
m See, e.g., Hamilton, Admistrative Practice Before the FAA and NTSB: Problems,
Trends and Developments, 46 J. AIR L. & CoM. 615 (1981) [hereinafter Hamilton,
1981]; Hamilton, Appellate Practice in Air Safety Proceedings, 10 Sw. U.L. REv. 247
(1978); Hamilton, Administrative Practice in Aviation Medical Proceedings, 26 EMORY L.
J. 565 (1977); Kovarick, Procedures Before the Federal Aviation Administration, 42 J. AIR
L. & Com. 11 (1976); Pangia, Handling FAA Enforcement Proceedings: A View From the
Inside, 46J. AIR L. & CoM. 573 (1981); Mathis, The Traffic Cop of the Skies - FAA
Enforcement Actions, 35 J. AIR L. & ComN. 40 (1969); Yodice, Airmen Certification and
Enforcement Procedures, 37J. AIR L. & Com. 281 (1971).
II Compare Pangia, supra note 10 with Hamilton, 1981, supra note 10.
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ing out issues from both the FAA's and the alleged viola-
tor's points of view. This section of the comment will
serve as a guide to the practitioner whose client is the sub-
ject of an FAA action. This comment will then address
some of the criticisms of the FAA enforcement program
and attempt to determine the validity of those criticisms.
In conclusion, this comment will present some sugges-
tions to alleged violators and their attorneys on dealing
with FAA enforcement of FARs.
II. MECHANICS OF AN ENFORCEMENT ACTION
An FAA enforcement action begins when the FAA re-
ceives information that an airman has violated a Federal
Aviation Regulation.12 This information comes princi-
pally from three sources. The first source of information
about FAR violations comes from FAA employees.' 3 As
FAA employees perform their various duties, they are re-
quired to report any violations of FARs that come to their
attention.14 The FAA, and therefore its employees, also
have the authority to re-examine any holder of an aviation
certificate.' 5 The statute providing for re-examination
does not require cause, only stating that re-examination
may be carried out "from time to time."' 6 Air traffic ser-
" See, FAA, COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM 43 (1980) [hereinafter
ENFORCEMENT]. This publication was used extensively in preparing this article
and it is an excellent source of information for anyone who is dealing with the
FAA in an enforcement proceeding. The government document number of this
handbook is TD 4.8/2:2150.3. Investigative and enforcement procedures are
governed by part 13 of the Federal Aviation Regulations, 14 C.F.R. § 13 (1987).
Is ENFORCEMENT, supra note 12, at 38.
'I Id. "Any agency employee who becomes aware of an apparent violation by,
or apparent lack of qualification of, any person subject to the Federal Aviation
Regulations, shall report such information to an appropriate FAA office." Id.
is 49 U.S.C. § 1429(a) (1982). This statute explicitly gives the authority men-
tioned to the Secretary of Transportation. The FAA, as a division of the Depart-
ment of Transportation, falls .under the control and authority of the Secretary.
in Id. The NTSB has, however, imposed a requirement that a FAA request for
re-examination must be reasonable. Elroy M. Ringer, 3 N.T.S.B. 3948, 3949
(1981). FAA policy is to re-examine wherever "reliable reports, personal knowl-
edge, or ... evidence obtained through investigation" suggest that a certificate
holder may not be qualified to exercise the certificate. ENFORCEMENT, supra note
12, at 101. If the certificate holder does not establish qualifications, the FAA will
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vice facilities provide the second source of information
about FAR violations.1 7 These facilities include air traffic
control centers, airport control towers, Flight Service Sta-
tions, and any other facility which monitors or has contact
with aircraft operations. The FAA's third possible source
of information regarding violation of FARs are individual
complaints from citizens. Both the Federal Aviation Act
of 1958 and the FARs contain provisions for reporting vi-
olations of the aviation statutes and regulations.'
After the FAA receives information that someone may
have violated a FAR, its first action is to examine the fac-
tual data available to determine if it should begin an in-
vestigation.' 9 This examination includes considering the
circumstances of the allegation and the nature of the vio-
lation. These steps serve both to determine if an investi-
gation is required, and as primary steps in an
investigation if one is indicated. 20
A. The Investigation
If the FAA determines that an investigation is in order
the first step is to notify the alleged violator through a
Letter of Investigation. 21 The FAA orally informs some
alleged violators of the investigation, but the FAA only
follows this procedure when circumstances dictate that
they take only administrative enforcement action. The
initiate a legal enforcement action to revoke the airman certificate. ld at 102.
For discussion of certificate enforcement action see infra notes 84-121 and accom-
panying text.
' ENFORCEMENT, supra note 12, at 37.
'K 49 U.S.C. § 1482(a) (1982); 14 C.F.R. § 13.1(a) (1987). "Any person may file
with the Secretary of Transportation ... a complaint in writing with respect to
anything done or omitted to be done by any person in contravention of this chap-
ter, or of any requirement established pursuant thereto." 49 U.S.C.A. § 1482(a)
(1982). "Any person who knows of a violation.., should report it to appropriate
personnel of any regional or district office." 14 C.F.R. § 13.1(a) (1987).
i" ENFORCEMENT, supra note 12, at 43.
2t Id.
2 Id. at 44. For sample Letter of Investigation see id at 63-69 (sample in Ap-
pendix A).
2 -Id. For discussion of administrative versus legal enforcement action see infra
notes 64-127 and accompanying text.
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Letter of Investigation describes the facts and circum-
stances the FAA is investigating and indicates that the
FAA believes these facts suggest that the alleged violator
failed to observe the FARs. 2' The letter usually does not
cite specific sections of the FARs that the FAA believes the
recipient violated and the FAA does not consider this let-
ter a statement of charges against a violator.2 4 A Letter of
Investigation gives a time limit in which the alleged viola-
tor can reply and may specify documents the alleged vio-
lator should retain. 5 If an alleged violator receives a
Letter of Investigation and does not respond within the
time period specified, the investigation will continue with-
out the certificate holder's statement. 6 The FARs do not
provide sanctions for failure to reply to a Letter of
Investigation.
The opportunity to respond at the time of the Letter of
Investigation allows an alleged violator to explain any ex-
tenuating circumstances and give his side of the story.
However, a response may also give the FAA important ev-
idence or information for its investigation. Therefore,
an alleged violator should carefully consider the situation
and contact an attorney before contacting the FAA.
After the Letter of Investigation is sent, the FAA will
23 ENFORCEMENT, supra note 12, at 45.
24 Id
25 Id.
20 See id at 64 for sample Letter of Investigation. The FAA informs alleged
violators in the Letter of Investigation that the investigation will continue with or
without the alleged violator's input. Id.
27 Although an alleged violator's first inclination upon receiving a Letter of In-
vestigation may be to contact the FAA and tell "his side of the story," even com-
mentators who disagree on the merits of the FAA enforcement program agree
that an alleged violator should contact an attorney before responding to a Letter
of Investigation. See Pangia, supra note 10, at 581; Hamilton, 1981, supra note 10,
at 623. In one case the FAA's evidence consisted primarily of information pro-
vided by the alleged violator in his response to the letter of investigation. William
Cody, 3 N.T.S.B. 3807, 3808 (1981) (FAA inspectors testify that Cody's statement
that there was only one quart of fuel in the tanks of his helicopter after a forced
landing suggested that fuel exhaustion was the reason for the incident). However,
the FAA might quickly end an investigation at this point if the alleged violator can
explain the circumstances of the alleged violation. See Pangia, supra note 10, at
581.
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begin its investigation procedures. The first step in these
procedures involves a request for information from other
FAA divisions regarding the alleged violator's certificates
and any past violations involving the alleged violator.2 8
The FAA next gathers evidence of the alleged violation.29
The FAA instructs its investigators to obtain this informa-
tion from "any place or source where it is legally avail-
able."30 The Federal Aviation Act gives the Secretary of
Transportation the power to "hold hearings, issue sub-
poenas, administer oaths, examine witnesses and receive
evidence" in furtherance of its investigation.8 1 Most en-
forcement investigations are informal and although broad
formal powers are available the FAA uses them only in
complex cases.8 2
In most investigations the FAA investigator initially vis-
its the scene of the alleged violation in order to collect
whatever physical evidence might be present and to deter-
mine any witnesses which the investigator might need to
interview."3 The FAA determines which witnesses to in-
terview based on the nature of the case, the proof re-
quired, and witness availability. 4 In most cases the FAA
investigator will interview at least two people: the person
making the allegation and the alleged violator.8 5 The in-
2• ENFORCEMENT, supra note 12, at 45. The NTSB holds that a violation free
record should not weigh in the violator's favor when the FAA is imposing a sanc-
tion or when an administrative law judge is reviewing an FAA action. Charles
Wilson, 2 N.T.S.B. 2454, 2455 (1976); Harold Hein, 3 N.T.S.B. 14, 15 (1977);
Rodney Herrig, 3 N.T.S.B. 73, 75 (1977); Benjamin Widtfeldt, 3 N.T.S.B. 1410,
1413 (1978). There are many cases in which the NTSB overrules an administra-
tive law judge for considering a clean previous record in the alleged violator's
favor. See, e.g., Charles Wilson, 2 N.T.S.B. 2454, 2455 (1976); Harold Hein, 3
N.T.S.B. 14, 15 (1977). These cases suggest, however, that a clean record can
help an alleged violator before an administrative law judge, assuming the NTSB
won't overrule every case where an ALJ considers a clean previous record in al-
leged violators favor.
" ENFORCEMENT, supra note 12, at 46.
.4o Id.
I 49 U.S.C. § 1484 (1982).
• Pangia, supra note 10 at 583. For FARs governing FAA formal fact finding
see infra note 54.
" ENFORCEMENT, supra note 12, at 46.
' Id.
- IdL at 48. 49.
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vestigator will also normally interview any other persons
involved in the alleged violation.3
The FAA's interview of the alleged violator presents an
area of some controversy. One commentator suggests
that this interview puts the alleged violator in a "self in-
crimination dilemma," where his options are to "prove
the prosecutor's otherwise unprovable case" or be
"targeted for especially harsh sanctions" due to his "un-
cooperative attitude. ' -7 Some basis may exist for this crit-
icism because the FAA may, in fact, look to the interview
with the alleged violator for information to "develop in-
vestigative leads."18  The FAA and some commentators
indicate that the interview provides an opportunity for the
alleged violator to discuss the incident rationally and ef-
fect a quick end to the investigation.3 9 However, this is
probably not the case. The FAA Compliance and En-
forcement manual reminds investigators that the purpose
of the interview is "not to divulge but to obtain informa-
tion. ' 40 The FAA also advises investigators not to "iden-
so d at 49.
37 See Hamilton, 1981, supra note 10, at 621. For a discussion of the self-incrim-
ination problem faced by alleged violators of FARs see infra notes 129-152 and
accompanying text.
so ENFORCEMENT, supra note 12, at 49.
The selection of the time for interviewing the person involved in the
alleged violation can be a critical decision. At times it is best to accu-
mulate solid evidence with which to confront the witness, while at
other times it may be necessary to interview early so as to develop
investigative leads. Only good judgment will dictate when the inter-
view should be conducted.Id.
39 See Pangia, supra note 10, at 581.
40 ENFORCEMENT, supra note 12, at 50.
The guidance for preparation and conduct of witness interviews ap-
plies also to interviews of alleged violators .... The inspector must
keep in mind that the purpose for the interview is not to divulge but
to obtain information. For example, do not identify sources of the
allegation or sources of other supportive evidence or information,
except where absolutely necessary. Care also must be taken not to
discuss possible enforcement actions or sanctions. The investigating
inspector does not have authority to grant immunity from criminal
prosecution or FAA enforcement action. If the inspector believes
that the granting of immunity to the person involved in a violation,
or to any other witness, is essential to the satisfactory completion of
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tify sources of the allegation or sources of other
supportive evidence" and that "[c]are also must be taken
not to discuss possible ... sanctions."' 4' Because of these
policies, alleged violators may find the investigatory inter-
view frustrating and one-sided.4 2
Documents are another form of evidence used in many
FAA enforcement cases. 43 The FAA often uses weather
reports, load manifests, operating manuals, communica-
tion logs, and aircraft logs. 44 The FAA also uses Air Traf-
fic Service Records from air traffic service facilities
(including Air Traffic Control Centers) in enforcement ac-
tions.45 Since air traffic service facilities only retain these
records for fifteen days,46 the retention period may expire
before an alleged violator receives a Letter of Investiga-
tion.4 7 Therefore, unless the alleged violator recognizes
that his conduct may lead to an investigation, the tapes
may be destroyed before he can obtain them to establish
his defense.48 Thus, an airman who has reason to believe
he might be subject to a FAA investigation should contact
an investigation, the Regional Counsel shall be consulted for advice.
In general, the grant of immunity by FAA would require approval by
the U.S. Attorney General as provided in the Organized Crime Con-
trol Act of 1970.
Id.
41 Id.
4 For self-incrimination questions presented by these procedures, see infra
notes 129-152 and accompanying text.
43 ENFORCEMENT, supra note 12, at 51.
4 Id. at 50.
4r See, e.g., Specht v. CAB, 254 F.2d 905 (8th Cir. 1958) (FAA used Air Traffic
Control (ATC) tapes to review conversation between pilot and air traffic control-
ler to determine if pilot violated FARs); Arthur C. Stifel, 3 N.T.S.B. 3536, 3537
(1981) (FAA used ATC tapes to demonstrate that Stifel failed to comply with ATC
instructions).
-, ENFORCEMENT, supra note 12, at 52.
'6 Pangia, supra note 10, at 589.
4S See, e.g., Harold Dwayne Beverage, 3 N.T.S.B. 2710 (1980). In the Beverage
case, the NTSB suggested that, because the persons involved in the conversation
testified at the hearing, absence of the ATC tapes did not unduly prejudice the
pilot. Id. at 2711. This suggests an alleged violator could call ATC personnel as
witnesses if he could not acquire ATC tapes. This might be helpful in situations
where ATC disposed of the tapes prior to the alleged violator receiving a Letter of
Investigation.
the Air Traffic service facility soon after the incident to
secure any tapes useful for his defense.
An alleged violator should also consider two other
points. First, although often used by NTSB accident in-
vestigators,49 cockpit voice recordings are not admissible
evidence in FAA enforcement actions.50 Second, medical
records from an alleged violator's physician or hospital
are usually privileged and the FAA cannot obtain them
without a subpoena.51 The FAA, however, often attempts
to acquire these records by obtaining the alleged viola-
tor's consent.5 2 An alleged violator should carefully con-
sider the consequences of relinguishing these records,
because once the FAA acquires the records they are ad-
missible in the enforcement action. 53
The FAA's enforcement investigations are normally
conducted informally following the procedures outlined
above. However, the Agency does have the power to con-
duct formal fact finding under Part 13 of the Federal Avia-
tion Regulations. 4 The FAA generally uses these
40 See, e.g., NTSB, AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT, Logair Flight 51, Kelly Air
Force Base, October 4, 1986 at 8 (April 9, 1987); NTSB, AIRCRAFr ACCIDENT RE-
PORT, Delta L-101 1, Dallas/Ft. Worth, August 2, 1985 at 24-25 (Aug. 15, 1986);
NTSB, AIRCRAFr ACCIDENT REPORT, Pilgrim Airlines Fokker F-27, Kennedy Inter-
national Airport, January 13, 1984 at 7 (Oct. 16, 1984).
Cockpit Voice Recorders, 14 C.F.R. § 121.359 (1986) (applicable to supple-
mental air carriers and commercial operators). "Information obtained from the
record is used to assist in determining the cause of accidents or occurrences in
connection with investigations under Part 830. The Administrator does not use
the record in any civil or certificate action." Id. § 135.151 (applicable to air-taxi
operators); see also George R. Rapattoni, I N.T.S.B. 241, 242-45 (1968) (use of
voice recorder was prejudicial error).
5' ENFORCEMENT, supra note 12, at 55.
52 The FAA Enforcement Manual states, "Where required, every effort should
be made to obtain from the person involved a written consent in order to obtain
such records. The person involved should be presented with an FAA Form 2759
(1-67), 'Authorization for the Release of Medical Information to the FAA,' for this
purpose." Id
.1 Calvin E. Deonier, 45 C.A.B. 916, 917 (1966) (CAB holds that, despite claim
of privilege, medical records are admissible). Moreover, the FAA might request
these records early in the investigation, even before the alleged violator knows
specifically the charges against him.
The FAA begins a formal investigationby issuing an order of investigation
under FAR 13. 14 C.F.R. §§ 13.3(c), 13.5(i) (1987). The FAR provisions for for-
mal fact finding, 14 C.F.R. §§ 13.101 - 13.131 (1987), provide for the FAA to,
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procedures when its actions would affect a large number
of persons or companies.55 Thus, the procedures gener-
ally are not utilized in actions involving individual certifi-
cate holders.
After an investigation the FAA prepares a summary of
its results in the form of an Enforcement Investigation Re-
port.56 This report serves as an excellent source of infor-
mation for alleged violators who wish to determine the
evidence against them. The Report consists of four basic
sections, each serving a specific function.57
Section A of the Report contains general information
about the alleged violator, the incident, the aircraft in-
volved, the owner of the aircraft, and the regulations
which the FAA believes have been violated.58 Section B of
the Report includes a summary of the facts of the case. 9
Section C of the Report contains evidence the investigator
has collected.60 This includes copies of all documental
proof as well as photographs of any physical evidence. 61
The final section, Section D, contains a complete factual
statement of the investigation and the investigator's
analysis of the relevant safety and enforcement considera-
tions.62 An alleged violator may obtain a copy of the com-
pleted Enforcement Investigation Report, but only from
the Regional Counsel of the FAA. 3
among other things, issue subpoenas, 14 C.F.R. § 13.111 (1987), initiate judicial
enforcement against any person who fails to comply with orders, 14 C.F.R.
§ 13.121 (1987), and take depositions, 14 C.F.R. § 13.125 (1987).
55 ENFORCEMENT, supra note 12, at 89.
"c Id. at 105.
Id. at 105-06.
Id. at 106-09. The FAA form number for the first section of Enforcement
Investigative Reports is 2150-5. The other sections of the report will accompany
this form. For sample of this form see Appendix B.
1, Id. at 109.
- Id at 110.
6! Id.
62 Id.
''.1 Id. at 110-11. An alleged violator should request a copy of the Enforcement
Investigative Report under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552
(1982). The amount of the Report which the alleged violator can obtain may be
limited by the circumstances and stage of the investigation, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)
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B. Enforcement Actions
Following preparation of an Enforcement Investigation
Report, the FAA's next step in an alleged violation of the
FARs is the enforcement phase itself. The FAA uses two
general forms of enforcement actions: administrative and
legal.64 Legal action receives the most treatment by the
commentators.6 5 Administrative action, being less serious,
is less likely to involve litigation or negotiations with the
FAA.
1. Administrative Enforcement Action
An FAA administrative enforcement action involves is-
suing the alleged violator a letter.6 It does not constitute
an adjudication of the charges.6 7 The FAA takes adminis-
trative action, as opposed to legal action, only if the mat-
ter has four characteristics: (1) no significantly unsafe
condition resulted from the violation; (2) the violation did
not involve a question of the violator's competency to
hold his certificate; (3) the violation was not deliberate;
and (4) the alleged violator has no previous record of sim-
ilar violations and shows constructive interest in comply-
ing with regulations.6 8 Although the FAA Compliance &
Enforcement manual suggests that administrative en-
forcement action is taken only when conclusive proof of a
violation of a FAR exists, the administrative action does
not formally charge the alleged violator with a violation. 9
Administrative action serves one of two purposes, re-
flected by the two types of letters utilized by the FAA. A
"Warning Notice" brings the incident to the attention of
(1982). Telephone interview with Dallas/Ft. Worth Regional Office of FAA (Sept.
21, 1987).
6, Enforcement, supra note 12, at 14.
- See generally, Hamilton, 1981, supra note 10; Kovarick, supra note 10; Pangia,
supra note 10; Yodice, supra note 10.
14 C.F.R. § 13.11(b) (1987). This letter may be either a Warning Notice or a
Letter of Correction. Id.
67 Id
- ENFORCEMENT, supra note 12, at 14.
at Id. at 141.
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the violator and advises that the incident may have in-
volved a violation of the FARs.70 This letter states that
the matter has been corrected or does not warrant legal
action, and requests compliance in the future.7 ' A "Letter
of Correction," on the other hand, states that the person
has violated a FAR and, according to a prior agreement
between the FAA and the violator, the violation has been
or will be corrected.7 2 If a violator does not take correc-
tive action after receiving a letter of correction, the FAA
may take legal enforcement action. 3
2. Legal Enforcement Action
If the circumstances dictate that administrative enforce-
ment action is inadequate to deal with a violation of the
FARs, the FAA will take legal enforcement action. Legal
enforcement actions provide the "teeth" for the FAA's
enforcement program. Sanctions include civil fines,
seizure of aircraft, actions against a violator's certificate,
orders of compliance, cease and desist orders, criminal
penalties, and injunctions 4.7  Legal actions are of two
types, civil actions and certificate actions.
a. Civil Action
The FAA generally imposes civil penalties in enforce-
ment actions where: (1) the violator does not hold a cur-
rent certificate, (2) the violator holds a certificate but the
violation does not involve a question of qualifications, or
(3) the violator holds a certificate, but suspension of the
certificate is not necessary to obtain corrective action.7 5
7. 14 C.F.R. § 13.11 (b)(l) (1987); ENFORCEMENT, supra note 12, at 141.
7 ENFORCEMENT, supra note 12, at 141. For further samples of warning notices,
see id. at 145-50 (sample in Appendix C).
12 14 C.F.R. § 13.11 (b)(2) (1987); Enforcement, supra note 12, at 141. For sam-
ple of Letter of Correction see id at 151-56 (sample in Appendix D).
14 C.F.R. § 13.11(b)(2) (1987).
14 C.F.R. §§ 13.13-13.27 subpart C (1987).
7, ENFORCEMENT, supra note 12, at 14-15. As an example of the situation where
a violator holds a certificate but suspension is unnecessary, the FAA manual
states, "where a major air carrier is involved in a maintenance violation and has
taken satisfactory corrective action, a substantial civil penalty will serve as an ap-
After the FAA has determined that a civil penalty is in or-
der, the FAA issues a civil penalty letter to the alleged vio-
lator.7 6 This letter contains a statement of the reasons for
the penalty, the FARs violated, and an offer to settle the
civil penalty for a given amount. 7" Although the regula-
tions don't require the FAA to hold an informal confer-
ence before proceeding with a civil penalty action, 7  FAA
policy does encourage a conference.79If an alleged violator does not accept the FAA's offer to
settle the civil penalty, and the FAA and the violator can-
not reach an agreement at an informal conference, the
FAA may instigate proceedings in a United States District
Court, through the United States Attorney, to collect the
penalty.80 The FAA may impose civil penalties up to
$1,000 per occurrence for violations of the Federal Avia-
tion Act of 1958 (or regulations issued under that act),8 '
or $10,000 per occurrence for violations of the Hazardous
Materials Transportation Act (or regulations issued under
that act). 2 The FAA will generally not take both civil and
certificate action against a violator for a single violation.83
propriate deterrent without disrupting essential air service to the public." Id at
15.
70 Id. at 164.
77 Id.; 14 C.F.R. § 13.15(b) (1987).
-' See 14 C.F.R. § 13.15 (1987).
79 ENFORCEMENT, supra note 12, at 164.
- Id. at 165; 14 C.F.R. § 13.15(e) (1987); see, e.g., United States v. Gaunce, 779
F.2d 1434 (9th Cir. 1986) (U.S. brought suit against pilot to recover civil penalty);
United States v. Lockheed L-188 Aircraft, 656 F.2d 390 (9th Cir. 1979) (U.S.
brought in rem action against aircraft for violation of safety regulations). The ac-
tion in the district court under 49 U.S.C. § 1473 is to "conform as nearly as may
be to civil suits in admiralty, except that with respect to proceedings involving
penalties other than those assessed by the Board, either party may demand trial by
jury of any issue of fact .... ." 49 U.S.C. § 1473(b)(1) (1982). This implementa-
tion of admiralty procedure allows the FAA to bring an action in rem against an
airplane. Congress included the clause allowing for a jury by request of either
party because the traditional admiralty procedure does not include a jury. GiL-
MORE & BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 35 (2d ed. 1975).
s' 49 U.S.C. § 1471 (1982); 14 C.F.R. § 13.15(a) (1987).
.2 49 U.S.C. § 1809 (1982); 14 C.F.R. § 13.16(a) (1987).
"3 ENFORCEMENT, supra note 12, at 163. The Compliance and Enforcement
Manual states,
(3) Multiple sanctions. It is FAA policy that civil penalty action and
punitve certificate action generally will not be instituted for the same
1987] COMMENTS 555
556 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [53
b. Certificate Action
If a civil penalty is not appropriate in a FAR violation
case, the FAA will often take action to revoke or suspend
an alleged violator's airman certificate. This is probably
the most common type of enforcement action taken by the
FAA in FAR violation cases.84 The FAA Compliance and
Enforcement Program follows the Federal Aviation Act
when it states that, "[s]uspension action should be consid-
ered in all cases where safety requires it." 85 The enforce-
ment manual also gives examples of situations where the
FAA considers suspension of a certificate the appropriate
remedy. 86 These situations include cases in which the vio-
lator's technical qualifications are in question, cases in-
volving a certificate holder resisting reexamination or
reinspection, and cases in which the nature of the viola-
tion suggests that the FAA should take punitive action.87
The FAA suggests that its counsel seek revocation, as op-
offense against a certificate holder. As a matter of law, an election to
impose one sanction is not a bar to a concurrent proceeding to im-
pose another; however, such action has the appearance of "double
jeopardy" and, in the usual situation, it is not necessary, as the
FAA's enforcement powers to proceed either by way of civil penalty
or certificate action are sufficient to satisfy the public interest with
respect to even the most serious violation. If counsel is of the opin-
ion that unusual circumstances in any case justify deviation from this
policy, counsel shall first consult with the Assistant Chief Counsel,
Regulations and Enforcement Divisions.
Id.
See, e.g., Wendell K. Howell, 1 N.T.S.B. 1 (1972); Willis John Miller, 1
N.T.S.B. 6 (1967); John Richard Hawke, I N.T.S.B. 7 (1967). The great majority
of cases reported on appeal to the NTSB are certificate action cases. The statutes
and regulations which cover enforcement action against a certificate are 49 U.S.C.
§ 1429 (1982), and 14 C.F.R. § 13.19 (1987).
- ENFORCEMENT, supra note 12, at 15; 49 U.S.C. § 1429(a) (1982).
" ENFORCEMENT, supra note 12, at 15.
97 Id. The courts have upheld the Civil Aeronautics Board's power to suspend
or revoke airmen's certificates for disciplinary reasons rather than limiting that
power to situations where the pilot was unqualified. See Specht v. CAB, 254 F.2d
905, 916 (8th Cir. 1958) (refusing to overturn CAB decision suspending airmans
certificate even though there was no question of pilot's technical ability); Hard v.
CAB, 248 F.2d 761, 764 (7th Cir. 1957) (CAB had discretion to suspend airman
certificate where airman's qualifications were not at issue); Wilson v. CAB, 244
F.2d 773, 774 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (refusing to overturn CAB's decision to suspend
Wilson's airman certificate).
posed to suspension, in cases where there is a lack of ca-
pability on the part of the violator that the violator cannot
readily correct.88 The FAA will also seek revocation in
cases where the violator, through repeat offenses, has
demonstrated an unwillingness or inability to comply with
the principles of air safety.8 9
Two important limitations exist on the FAA's power to
revoke or suspend airman certificates. First, except in an
emergency, 90 the FAA must notify an airman of charges or
reasons and provide an opportunity for him to answer
before it may revoke or suspend his airman certificate. 9 '
Second, only a few high ranking officials within the FAA
can order a suspension or revocation. 92
The FAA begins a certificate enforcement action by
providing notice to the alleged violator.98 The notice in-
forms the alleged violator of the facts alleged, the regula-
tions violated, and the action proposed by the FAA.94
The FAA attempts to set forth the facts in such a way that
the alleged violator can understand the charges against
him.95 The notice also includes a form which the alleged
violator must fill out to indicate his response to the ac-
tion. 6 The alleged violator may either: (1) request that
the FAA issue an order so that he may appeal to the Na-
tional Transportation Safety Board,97 (2) request an infor-
mal hearing with the FAA,98 (3) respond to the charges by
s' ENFORCEMENT, supra note 12, at 15.
"i Id
9" See infra notes 110-115 and accompanying text for discussion of the FAA's
emergency power.
9' 49 U.S.C. § 1429(a) (1982); Pastrana v. United States, 746 F.2d 1447, 1450
(1 th Cir. 1984) (FAA's suspension of pilot's airman certificate without a presus-
pension hearing violated the pilot's Fifth Amendment right to due process).
Pastrana, 746 F.2d at 1450.
" ENFORCEMENT, supra note 12 at 168. 14 C.F.R. § 13.19(c) (1987).
N ENFORCEMENT, supra note 12, at 168.
9' Id.
14 C.F.R. § 13.19(c) (1987).
to Id. § 13.19(c)(3). This choice only applies to cases where the violation is
under Title VI of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958. This Title is Safety Regula-
tions of Civil Aeronautics. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1421-1432 (1982).
i' 14 C.F.R. § 13.19(c)(4) (1987).
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written statement,99 (4) admit the charges and surrender
his certificate, 00 or (5) request a formal hearing under the
Rules of Practice for FAA Hearings (this option is avail-
able to the violator only if the violation concerns owner-
ship and registration of an aircraft).' 0'
An alleged violator may wish to appeal the FAA's certif-
icate enforcement action to the NTSB immediately. If so
the alleged violator selects option one and requests that
the FAA issue a final order. The alleged violator can then
appeal that order in accordance with the procedure in the
FARs. 0 2
If the alleged violator elects to attend an informal con-
ference with the FAA, the FAA's counsel selects a location
and represents the FAA at that conference. 0 3 At the con-
ference, the FAA evaluates the violator's attitude and the-
oretically both the FAA and the violator reach a better
understanding of the incident.10 4 The FAA suggests that
the goal of the informal conference is either to urge the
violator to accept the sanctions against him or to unearth
facts which indicate the FAA should withdraw the
charges. 0 5 The FAA does not use the informal confer-
ence to gather additional evidence against the violator or
to increase the sanction against him.10 6 If the alleged vio-
lator elects to request an informal conference or respond
to the FAA's charges in writing, the FAA will issue its or-
der after considering all the information the alleged viola-
Id. § 13.19(c)(2).
Id. § 13.19(c)(1).
Id. § 13.19(c)(5). The Rules of Practice for FAA Hearings are Subpart D of
section 13 of the Federal Aviation Regulations. 14 C.F.R. §§ 13.31-13.63 (1986).
The alleged violator cannot elect this option unless the alleged violation falls
under Title V of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1406
(1982).
1'-2 See infra notes 116-121 and accompanying text.
"- ENFORCEMENT, supra note 12, at 165.
1- Id. at 170.
10.1 Id. The Compliance and Enforcement Manual states, "In many instances,
the informal conference process will disclose facts not revealed in the violation




If the alleged violator elects at the time of the notice of
certificate action to surrender his certificate, the FAA is-
sues an order under part 13 of the FARs.' 08 The FAA
dates the order effective on the date the alleged violator
surrenders his certificate. 0 9
The Federal Aviation Act and the FARs also empower
the FAA to revoke or suspend certificates without notice
in an emergency." 0 The FAA does not exercise emer-
gency power unless either the alleged violator has exhib-
ited a lack of qualification to exercise his certificate, or he
has indicated that he will not act in accordance with regu-
lations."' Even then, the FAA will not use emergency
power unless the alleged violator will likely continue us-
ing his certificate during the time prior to receiving sus-
pension or revocation notice." 2 The FAA exercises its
emergency power most often in cases of deliberate reck-
lessness or where an airman continues to fly after a medi-
cal examiner informs him that he is no longer qualified to
hold an airman medical certificate." 3 Federal courts have
held that the exercise of FAA emergency powers does not
infringe on the alleged violator's right to due process." 4
ID- 14 C.F.R. § 13.19(c) (1987).
I' ENFORCEMENT, supra note 12, at 171. This order is issued by either the FAA
Chief Counsel, Assistant Chief Counsel for Regulations and Enforcement, the Re-
gional Counsel involved, or the Aeronautical Center Counsel. 14 C.F.R.
§ 13.19(c) (1987).
'-' ENFORCEMENT, supra note 12, at 171.
im Id.; 49 U.S.C. § 1485 (1982).
it, ENFORCEMENT, supra note 12, at 173. See Herman A. Schoenbachler, 1
N.T.S.B. 682, 683 (1969) (pilot stated in a hearing that he would continue to vio-
late a minimum ceiling requirement and the Administrator used emergency power
to suspend his airman's certificate).
Enforcement, supra note 12, at 174.
,. Id. at 16. Medical certificates for airmen are issued by the FAA after the
applicant for the certificate is examined by a designated medical examiner in ac-
cordance with 14 C.F.R. § 67 (1987). That section provides for first, second, and
third class airman medical certificates. 14 C.F.R. §§ 67.13, 67.15, 67.17 (1987).
1- Stem v. Butterfield, 529 F.2d 407, 411 (5th Cir. 1976) (FAA revoked pilot's
certificate without notice where pilot violated FARs prohibiting acrobatic flight in
a control zone and acrobatic flight below a certain altitude); Air East, Inc. v. Na-
tional Transp. Safety Bd., 512 F.2d 1227, 1230-31 (3d Cir. 1975)(FAA revoked
Air East's air taxi certificate without notice after an intense investigation found Air
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Generally, courts determine whether the FAA has in-
fringed on the alleged violator's right to due process by
balancing the public interest in safety against the alleged
violator's right to a hearing prior to suspension. 1 5
After the FAA issues an order involving a violator's cer-
tificate, the violator may appeal the order to the National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB).1 16 The FAA coun-
sel that has handled the case generally represents the FAA
before the NTSB Administrative Law Judge, and the
FAA's order serves as the complaint against the alleged
violator." 7 In these proceedings the Rules of Practice in
Air Safety Proceedings"" apply.' 9 After the hearing by
the NTSB Administrative LawJudge, the violator may ap-
peal to the full NTSB. 20  The violator may appeal the
NTSB's judgment to the federal court of appeals in the
circuit where he resides or does business, or in the circuit
court for the District of Columbia Circuit.1 2 1
In addition to administrative, civil, and certificate ac-
tions, the FAA may take other actions in enforcing FARs.
These may include seizure of aircraft, 22 issuance of vari-
East had allowed overloading of flights, flights without proper instruments, and
flights without proper repairs).
I,.s Although the courts generally rely on a balancing test which weighs public
safety against the alleged violator's right to a presuspension hearing to support
the FAA's emergency action, at least one case supports emergency action by
pointing out the minimal nature of the deprivation. Aircrane, Inc. v. Butterfield,
369 F. Supp. 598, 608 (E.D. Pa. 1974)(FAA seized a helicopter without a hearing
after the FAA determined that Aircrane was violating a FAR).
-1 49 U.S.C. § 1429(a) (1982); 14 C.F.R. § 13.19(d) (1987); ENFORCEMENT,
supra note 12, at 171-73.
,,7 ENFORCEMENT, supra note 12, at 171, 172.
,, 49 C.F.R. § 821 (1986).
See Otho Mowdite Cockes, 2 N.T.S.B. 1756, 1756-59 (1975) (NTSB states
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply to areas not covered by Rules of
Practice in Air Safety Proceedings).
s- 49 C.F.R. § 821.47 (1986).
,, 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1429(a), 1486(a)-(b) (1982).
'-a 14 C.F.R. § 13.17 (1987). This section provides that the FAA or a Federal
or State law enforcement officer may seize an aircraft if the aircraft is involved in a
violation for which the FAA could impose a civil penalty. Id. § 13.17(a). The sec-
tion provides that whoever seizes the aircraft must place the aircraft in suitable
storage. Id. § 13.17(b). The section also requires that counsel for the FAA give
notice to the owner of the aircraft, send a report of the seizure to the U.S. Attor-
ous orders of compliance or denial,1 23 and request for in-
junctions.1 24 The FAA uses these enforcement methods
only in extraordinary circumstances. 25  The FAA may
also participate to a limited extent in criminal cases in-
volving violations of FARs. 126 This participation mainly
involves turning over the FAA's investigation report to a
local United States Attorney's office.' 2 7
III. CRITICISMS OF THE SYSTEM
When the FAA takes enforcement action against a cer-
tificate holder, the FAA may be depriving that person of
property (in a civil action) or of a valuable right to per-
form as an airman. Therefore, airmen and others involved
in the system are sometimes concerned whether the
FAA's enforcement procedures contain adequate safe-
guards to protect the rights of accused violators. Some
criticisms of the present enforcement procedures include:
(1) that the procedures violate an alleged violator's Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination; (2) that
the burden of proof in an enforcement action is often un-
fairly shifted to the alleged violator; and (3) that the ad-
missibility of hearsay evidence in Air Safety Proceedings
ney's office, and release the aircraft if the owner pays the civil penalty or provides
a bond for the penalty. Id § 13.17(c)-(e).
1- 14 C.F.R. § 13.20 (1987). This section provides that, except in cases of
emergency as determined by the Federal Aviation Administrator, the FAA must
notify the person subject to an order before that order is issued. Id. § 13.20(b).
The FAA is required to give the person subject to such an order an opportunity to
reply in writing or request an oral hearing. Id. § 13.20(c). For a discussion of
when the FAA generally uses emergency power, see supra notes 110-113 and ac-
companying text.
,24 14 C.F.R. § 13.25 (1987); 49 U.S.C. app. § 1487 (1982). When the FAA de-
termines that a person is violating or is about to violate a FAR, the Federal Avia-
tion Act of 1958, or the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act, the FAA's
counsel requests the U.S. Attorney General's office to bring an injunctive action in
the U.S. District Court. 14 C.F.R. § 13.25 (1987).
1'2 See ENFORCEMENT, supra note 12, at 176-77. Although these actions are rare,
they may become more common. The FAA Enforcement Program suggests that
seizure of an aircraft is considered where the violator is known to have insufficient
assets, other than the aircraft to compromise or satisfy a civil penalty. Id. This
situation might exist in the smaller airlines which have arisen since deregulation.
'u 14 C.F.R. § 13.23 (1987).
1,, ENFORCEMENT, supra note 12, at 186-87.
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eases the FAA's burden of proof.128
A. Self-Incrimination
After the FAA investigates an alleged violation of the
FARs, the U.S. Attorney's office may use the results of
that investigation in a criminal prosecution. 29 This sug-
gests that the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-in-
crimination may apply to these investigations.3 0
The Supreme Court case of Mathis v. United States '' in-
dicates that perhaps the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion applies even though an investigation is not initiated
on the basis of anticipated criminal enforcement.1 2 In
Mathis investigators for the IRS questioned the defendant
in a "routine tax investigation" while he was being held in
a state prison on other charges.133 After considering doc-
uments and oral statements that the IRS investigator ob-
tained during this routine investigation, the jury convicted
Mathis of filing false claims against the Government.13 4
The Supreme Court held that the privilege against self-
incrimination applied in this case where the possibility ex-
ists that the information acquired would be used in a
criminal proceeding against the person.13 5 This decision
suggests that the courts should require the FAA to give
alleged violators, prior to interviewing them, a warning
similar to that described in Miranda v. Arizona.'36 The
- See Hamilton, 1981, supra note 10, at 619-22.
'- See supra notes 126-127 and accompanying text.
1-10 For a proponent of this position see Hamilton, 1981, supra note 10, at 620.
'.' 391 U.S. 1 (1968).
I. d. at 2-4.
'"Id.
Id. at 2-3.
Mathis, 391 U.S. at 4. Justice White, joined by Justice Harlan and Justice
Stewart dissented from this opinion on several grounds. Id at 5. The Justices
dissented because they thought the Miranda doctrine, see infra note 136, should be
abandoned, the investigation was civil and not criminal, and Mathis was not "in
custody" in the sense in which the phrase was used in Miranda. Id. at 5-8. For a
discussion of the "in custody" issue see infra notes 143-152 and accompanying
text.
," 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The Miranda decision was in response to four similar
cases that came to the U.S. Supreme Court from the New York Court of Appeals,
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courts and the NTSB have rejected this theory on several
grounds and have distinguished FAA type investigations
from those circumstances which require Miranda
warnings.
For example, the Civil Aeronautics Board rejected Mi-
randa type warnings in FAA legal enforcement actions in
Gordon H. Smith.' 3 7 In that case, the Civil Aeronautics
Board 38 held that the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination does not apply to certificate enforce-
ment actions since those actions are civil, as opposed to
criminal, and remedial, as opposed to punitive, in na-
ture.'3 9 The NTSB has used this same analysis in several
cases.' 40 These cases do not address the holding in Mathis
that Miranda warnings must be given when the possibility
exists during the investigation that the work will end up in
a criminal prosecution.' 4 ' The above mentioned cases do,
however, point out a basic flaw in the argument that the
Constitution requires the FAA to give alleged violators a
Miranda type warning, in that these cases suggest that the
the California Supreme Court, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
and the Arizona Supreme Court. Id. at 436. In all four cases police questioned a
defendant in a police station after arrest, and the state used the defendant's result-
ing admissions against the defendant at trial. Id at 440. The Supreme Court held
that before an investigator may question a suspect who is in custody in a criminal
investigation, the suspect must be informed of his right to remain silent, that any-
thing he says may be used against him, that he has the right to an attorney, and
that he may have an appointed attorney if he cannot afford his own. lId at 479.
The Court further held that if these procedures were not followed, any evidence
the investigator acquired from questioning the suspect would not be admissible in
court. Id. For discussion of the Miranda doctrine and its development, see Bel-
son, "Public-Safety" Exception to Miranda: The Supreme Court Writes Away Rights, New
York v. Quarles, 61 CHi. KENT L. REv. 577 (1985); Lederer, Miranda v. Arizona -
The Law Today, 78 MIL. L. REV. 107 (1977); Sonenshein, Miranda and the Burger
Court: Trends and Countertrends, 13 Loy. U. CHt. L.J. 405 (1982).
"s 44 C.A.B. 864 (1966).
,.' Prior to 1968, alleged violators appealed FAA orders to the Civil Aeronau-
tics Board as opposed to the National Transportation Safety Board.
'so Smith, 44 C.A.B. at 865.
140 Odell L. Burton, 3 N.T.S.B. 3357, 3358 (1981); Leon Salkind, 1 N.T.S.B.
714, 716 (1970);John Ray Gable, I N.T.S.B. 654, 656 (1969) (the N.T.S.B. points
out that 49 U.S.C. § 1484(i) [now repealed] requires that an alleged violator must
assert his privilege against self incrimination before the immunity resulting from it
will arise).
,- Mathis, 391 U.S. at 4.
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absence of the Miranda warning bears on the required evi-
dence's admissibility in a criminal proceeding, not on the
propriety of the civil investigation.1 42
Therefore, the FAA need not give an alleged violator a
Miranda warning in order to use his statements in a civil
proceeding. Futhermore, those statements can probably
also be used in a criminal prosecution because the alleged
violator is not in "custody" at the time of his interview. In
Miranda, the court stated, "we hold that when an individ-
ual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by
the authorities in any significant way and is subjected to ques-
tioning, the privilege against self-incrimination isjeopard-
ized." 143  In Orozco v. Texas, 14 4  the Supreme Court
extended the Miranda doctrine outside the police station
to include questioning of a murder suspect in his bed-
room at a boarding house. The suspect was, however,
"under arrest and not free to leave when he was ques-
tioned."'' 45 After Mathis and Orozco some commentators
speculated that the courts would extend "custody" to sit-
uations where the party being questioned was not for-
mally in custody.' 46  However, it seems clear that the
FAA's questioning of alleged FAR violators does not
qualify. 147
142 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. "The prosecution may not use statements... unless
it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege
against self-incrimination." Id (emphasis added).
16 Id. at 478 (emphais added).
'" 394 U.S. 324 (1969). In the Orozco case the defendant was involved in a
shooting and afterwards went back to his boarding house. Police came to the
boarding house and questioned him in his bedroom, during which time he was
not free to leave. Id. at 325. The Supreme Court held that these facts indicate
that Orozco was "in custody," even though not in a police station, and that the
Miranda doctrine applied. Id. at 326. Therefore, Orozco's admissions that he
owned a pistol and where the pistol was hidden were not admissible. Id. at 325-
26.
Id. at 327.
Lay, The Effect of Mathis on Right to Counsel in Tax Investigations, 14 ViLL. L.
REV. 689, 695-702 (1969).
1- Many questionable "custody" cases involved situations in which the party
being questioned had much less freedom than an alleged violator would have
while being interviewed by the FAA. See, e.g., Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. Dott,
302 F. Supp. 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (plaintiff Wunsch was instructed by his em-
ployer to answer all questions of the Treasury Dept. and the agents told him his
In Beckwith v. United States, 148 the Supreme Court held
that Beckwith was not entitled to a Miranda warning even
though he was under criminal investigation for income tax
violations.1 49 The special agents of the Internal Revenue
Service interviewed Mr. Beckwith extensively in his
home. 50 Although the internal revenue investigators gave
Beckwith some warning in that case, 151 the Court did not
rest its holding upon the warning given, but upon the fact
that "[a]n interview with Government agents in a situation
such as the one shown ... simply does not present the
elements which the Miranda court found so inherently co-
ercive. 152 Beckwith held that tax agents interviewing a
suspected tax violator in a criminal investigation did not
trigger the application of the Miranda doctrine. Therefore
FAA interviews with alleged FAR violators probably also
fall outside that doctrine, since FAA investigations are not
primarily criminal and alleged violators are almost never
in custody.
B. The Lindstam Doctrine
Another complaint regarding FAA enforcement actions
is that the burden of proof is often unfairly shifted to the
alleged violator. This is sometimes accomplished through
the Lindstam Doctrine.
Gordon Lindstam worked as a pilot for Northwest Air-
answers would be confidential); United States v. Montez-Hernandez, 291 F. Supp.
712 (E.D. Cal. 1968) (plaintiff's car was stopped by immigration officials and one
official approached from each side while asking plaintiff for his "papers").
14a 425 U.S. 341 (1976).
14 In the Beckwith case IRS agents went to Beckwith's home at eight a.m. and,
after Beckwith invited them into the house, they waited while he finished dressing.
ld. at 342-43. The agents then told Beckwith his rights and questioned him for
about three hours. Id. at 345. The Supreme Court held that when IRS agents
questioned Beckwith in his home he was not "in custody." Id at 348.
15 Id at 343.
I' Id
152 Id at 347. Justice Marshall concurred in the result only because of the warn-
ing that the IRS special agents gave Beckwith prior to the questioning. Id. at 348.
Justice Brennan dissented from the court's holding, stating that the application of
Miranda depended on "conditions that have the practical consequence of compel-
ling the taxpayer to make disclosures." Id. at 350.
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lines.' 53 On March 8, 1962, he was piloting a Boeing
720B between Miami and Ft. Lauderdale, Florida. 54
While Lindstam attempted to land at Ft. Lauderdale, his
aircraft struck the ground 84 feet before reaching the ap-
proach end of the runway.I5 The FAA charged Mr. Lind-
stain with careless operation of an aircraft and based its
case on evidence that: (1) the aircraft landed short of the
runway; (2) the area where the aircraft landed was marked
with chevrons (a marking indicating that the landing
threshold is further ahead); (3) the landing gear were be-
low runway level on impact; and (4) no weather condi-
tions or mechanical defects existed which might have
caused the accident. 56 In Gordon H. Lindstam,1 57 the Civil
Aeronautics Board (CAB) held that, where an aviation ac-
cident had occurred, the FAA need not prove specific acts
of carelessness on the part of the pilot in order to sanction
that pilot for violation of regulations which prohibit care-
less operation of an aircraft.' 58 The CAB stated that the
FAA had established a prima facie case against Lindstam,
not on the basis of res ipsa loquitur, but instead on the prin-
ciple that the FAA can use circumstantial evidence to es-
tablish a prima facie case of negligence.159 The NTSB
often applies the Lindstam doctrine to cases where the
FAA contends that an alleged violator carelessly operated
'-- Gordon H. Lindstam, 41 C.A.B. 841 (1964).
- Id.
' Id.
"a Id. at 842.
15 41 C.A.B. at 841.
- Mr. Lindstam was sanctioned under section 60.12 of the Civil Air Regula-
tions. That section is now section 91.9 of the Federal Aviation Regulations, which
reads, "No person may operate an aircraft in a careless or reckless manner so as to
endanger the life or property of another." 14 C.F.R. § 91.9 (1987).
0!, Lindstam, 41 C.A.B. at 842. The court based its statement that circumstantial
evidence can be used to create a prima facie case of a violation on the case of
Sheldon E. Pangburn, 35 C.A.B. 907 (1962), where the CAB held that Pangburn
was prima facie careless under Civil Air Regulation 60.12 when the aircraft he was
piloting struck a dike while on approach to land. The FAA's evidence in that case
showed only that the weather was normal, there was no mechanical failure, and
the runway was adequate to facilitate a normal landing. 35 C.A.B. at 910; see supra
note 158 for explanation of Civil Air Regulation 60.12.
an aircraft16 0 in relation to an accident or an incident.1 6 1
The NTSB has said that the Lindstam doctrine "does not
create a presumption of carelessness, but only an infer-
ence, which the examiner is permitted, but not compelled,
to draw from the circumstantial evidence."1 62 Although
the NTSB contends that the burden of proof remains with
the FAA regardless of the inference of carelessness, that
inference shifts to the alleged violator the burden of "go-
ing forward with the evidence, and of explaining away the
case thus made."'163 This has the practical effect of shift-
ing the burden of proof to the alleged violator, a harsh
decision where, by definition, no direct evidence as to the
cause of the accident or incident can be found. The
NTSB suggests that an alleged violator can overcome the
"inference of carelessness" created by the Lindstam doc-
trine by giving any reasonable explanation for the acci-
dent. 1 However, in practice, the violator's burden under
the Lindstam doctrine has been somewhat higher.
In Frank E. Davis, 165 Mr. Davis was charged with careless
operation of an aircraft 66 when the plane he was piloting
ran off of a runway into a snow covered field. The runway
had patches of packed snow, and the airport crew had ap-
plied sand to increase traction for braking. 67 Mr. Davis
contended that the runway was not in the condition that
FAA personnel reported to him and that misinformation
"" See 14 C.F.R. § 91.9 (1987).
Henry Davis, I N.T.S.B. 1517, 1520 (1971). The FARs defined an "aircraft
accident" as, "an occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft which
takes place between the time any person boards the aircraft with the intention of
flight and all such persons have disembarked, and in which any person suffers
death or serious injury, or in which the aircraft receives substantial damage." 49
C.F.R. § 830.2 (1986). An "incident" means, "an occurrence other than an acci-
dent, associated with the operation of an aircraft, which affects or could affect
safety." Id.
'i" Heny Davis, 1 N.T.S.B. at 1521.
"'Id.
"~Id.
1 N.T.S.B. 420 (1969).
'M 14 C.F.R. § 91.9 (1987); see supra note 158.
Frank E. Davis, 1 N.T.S.B. at 422.
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resulted in the accident on landing. 6 8 The NTSB con-
ceded that FAA personnel may not have reported the con-
dition of the runway correctly, but still held that Davis did
not overcome the "inference of carelessness" created by
the Lindstam doctrine.1 6 9 In Joseph N. Schneider,170 the air-
craft piloted by Mr. Schneider, while on an instrument ap-
proach, struck obstacles approximately 700 feet short of
the runway.17 1 Mr. Schneider testified that his altimeter
never indicated that the aircraft was below the decision
height 72 for the approach.'7 FAA investigators checked
the aircraft altimeter system after the incident, and it gave
a false reading of 180 feet higher than actual altitude in
one test. 74 One witness testified that an altimeter error
probably did occur during Mr. Schneider's approach,
while two other witnesses testified that an error probably
did not occur.'"7 The NTSB found, however, that the
FAA had presented a prima facie case under the Lindstam
doctrine and that Schneider had not overcome the infer-
ence of carelessness. 76  The NTSB suspended Schnei-
der's airline transport pilot certificate for 40 days. 77
The Lindstam doctrine often combines with the very
high degree of care required of airline transport pilots
(ATP) t7 8 to result in the FAA imposing sanctions in cir-
"" Id.; see supra note 158 for description of the FAR Davis was accused of
violating.
";1 Frank E. Davis, I N.T.S.B. at 422.
-' 1 N.T.S.B. 1553 (1971).
,7, Id. at 1558 (contained in initial decision by administrative law judge).
I'- "Decision Height" with respect to the operation of aircraft means the height
at which a decision must be made during an ILS or PAR instrument approach, to
either continue the approach or to execute a missed approach. 14 C.F.R. § 1.1
(1987). When an aircraft reaches this altitude on an approach the pilot is to pro-
ceed no lower. If the pilot then has the runway environment in sight such that he
can safely land using visual references he may land; if not, he must execute a
missed approach.
"Is Schneider, 1 N.T.S.B. at 1555.
174 Id.
175 Id.
1"n, Id. at 1557.
177 Id. at 1558.
17" See Charles B. Stead, 1 C.A.B. 74 (1939). "The Civil Aeronautics Authority
interprets the act of Congress which it administers as calling for the highest de-
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cumstances which might indicate the pilot was not care-
less. 79 Nevertheless, the NTSB has held the doctrine
applicable to all pilot certificates, not just ATP
certificates. '10
Although the Lindstam doctrine clearly creates a prob-
lem for airmen who are involved in accidents or incidents
and are then accused of violations of the FARs, two fac-
tors help mitigate this problem. First, the normal sanc-
tion imposed in cases based on the Lindstam doctrine is a
suspension of the airman certificate involved for a period of
thirty to ninety days. 18 1 Thirty to ninety days can be a
very long time to a commercial pilot unable to fly, and the
sanctions may be a hardship. However, the alleged viola-
tor whose case is proven by the Lindstam doctrine can take
heart because I found no cases in which the doctrine was
used to revoke a pilot certificate.
Second, an apparent decline in the use of the Lindstam
doctrine may mitigate its effect. In the period between
April, 1967 and December 1972, eleven cases reached a
full NTSB review and were reported citing the Lindstam
doctrine.'8 2 In the three year period between January,
1973 and December, 1976 only four cases reported cited
Lindstam, and in the four year period between January,
1977 and December, 1981 only two cases cited that
authority.8 5
gree of care on the part of those who sit at the controls of the air liners that carry
the traveling public." l at 84-85.
179 See, e.g., Frank E. Davis, 1 N.T.S.B. 420, 425 (1969) (pilot loses control on
snow covered runway);Joseph N. Schneider, I N.T.S.B. 1553, 1557 (1971) (faulty
altimeter presents possible cause of accident).
-" Harold E. Hibbard, 1 N.T.S.B. 1152, 1154 (NTSB disagrees with the Admin-
istrative Law Judge's contention that the Lindstam doctrine does not apply to pri-
vate pilots).
- Hugh R. Wells, 1 N.T.S.B. 1489, 1490 (1971), modified, I N.T.S.B. 1470
(1972) (citing Davis, 1 N.T.S.B. 420 (1969); Simmonds, I N.T.S.B. 1122 (1971);
O'Leary, I N.T.S.B. 913 (1970); and Lindtam, 41 C.A.B. 841 (1964) for the conten-
tion that the normal sanction based on the Lindstam doctrine is a thirty to ninety
day suspension).
IK2 Table of Aviation Decisions Cited, 1 N.T.S.B. XIV (1973).
's Table of Aviation Decisions Cited, 2 N.T.S.B. XV (1978); Table of Aviation
Decisions Cited, 3 N.T.S.B. XVIII (1984). Although this decline could be due to
factors other than a decline in the use of the Lindstam doctrine, (such as cases
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C. Hearsay Evidence
When an alleged violator appeals a FAA order revoking
or suspending an airman certificate to the NTSB, the
NTSB conducts a hearing according to the Rules of Prac-
tice for Air Safety Proceedings.' 8 4 The FAA bears the
burden of proof in this hearing and must prove its case by
a preponderance of reliable, probative, and substantial ev-
idence.1 85  Hearsay evidence is admissible in the hear-
ing, 86 and the NTSB has held hearsay evidence to be
"substantial" within the burden of proof rule.18 7 As a re-
sult of these rules, the FAA can issue an order against an
airman certificate, present the NTSB with the testimony of
its investigators who spoke to those who observed the al-
leged violation,' 88 and end up with a prima facie case
against the alleged violator. The prima facie case shifts
the burden of production to the alleged violator, 89 who
may not be prepared to obtain and present evidence to
based on Lindstam not being appealed to the NTSB) another indication of the
doctrine's disfavor is that neither of the cases citing Lindstam between 1977 and
1981 relied on that doctrine for the decision. Donald R. Hardin, 3 N.T.S.B. 1973,
1975 (1979); Harold H. Hamre, 3 N.T.S.B. 28, 31 (1977).
184 49 C.F.R. § 821 (1986).
1'5 See, e.g., William Hayes Cody, 3 N.T.S.B. 3807 (1981); Union Flight, Inc., 3
N.T.S.B. 1371, 1373 (1978); William A. Nurnberger, 3 N.T.S.B. 705, 707 (1977).
18, See, e.g., John Stanley Trier, 2 N.T.S.B. 379, 380 (1973); Milton Sacks, 1
N.T.S.B. 1894 (1972).
,"' Andrew Ortner, 2 N.T.S.B. 396, 397 n.5 (1973) (states that hearsay evidence
can be "substantial" even when not corroborated).
-' The NTSB has held that double hearsay is inadmissable as evidence. William
Henry Smith, 2 N.T.S.B. 2527, 2528 (1976). Therefore, the NTSB will not allow
an investigator to testify as to what a party questioned by the investigator heard
from others about the alleged violation.
I"" Erickson v. NTSB, 758 F.2d 285, 288 (8th Cir. 1985) (court states that once
the FAA makes a prima facie case of FAR violation, the burden of production
shifts to the alleged violator); Newman v. Shaffer, 494 F.2d 1219, 1220 (2nd Cir.
1974) (creation of prima facie case shifted burden of production to alleged viola-
tor). The burden ofproofmay also shift to the alleged violator if he asserts that he
did violate the regulations but that he was justified in doing so. Haines v. DOT,
449 F.2d 1073, 1076 (D.C. Cir. 1971)(court rejected pilot's contention that flying
below a prescribed minimum altitude did not prove absence of danger); Specht v.
CAB, 254 F.2d 905 (8th Cir. 1958) (court held that pilot had not overcome the
burden of proof that his deviation from FARs was necessary in the situation). If
the alleged violator admits violating the FARs and thus bears the burden of proof,
the admissibility of hearsay evidence may be in his favor.
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rebut the FAA investigator's testimony. The lack of provi-
sions for discovery under the Rules of Practice for Air
Safety Proceedings compounds this problem.1 90
An alleged violator or his attorney should note how-
ever, that the admissibility of hearsay evidence may favor
the alleged violator in some circumstances. Although the
rule may reduce the FAA's burden to produce evidence to
create a prima facie case, it may also make the evidence
which the alleged violator can most easily obtain (testi-
mony of persons who know something about the alleged
violation), easier for him to present to the NTSB. The
alleged violator may also call FAA investigators to testify
to facts in the case.1 91 This may allow the alleged violator
to use the admissibility of hearsay evidence to his
advantage.
IV. CONCLUSION
The policies and procedures through which the FAA
enforces the FARs can subject an alleged violator to un-
warranted sanctions. However, probably no error free
legal system exists. At least one commentator suggests
that the FAA should modify its enforcement mechanism
to more closely resemble that of our criminal system.1 92
This type of modification would undoubtedly result in
more lenient enforcement of the Federal Aviation Regula-
tions and could conceivably have a great impact on air
safety. In weighing air safety against the rights of a rela-
tively few airman certificate holders, the legislative scales
will undoubtedly tip in favor of public safety.
- 49 C.F.R. § 821.19 (1986). Automatic discovery provisions consist only of
allowing the alleged violator to take the depositions of witnesses. All other dis-
covery effectively proceeds on order by the Administrative LawJudge assigned to
the case. Id.
11, 49 C.F.R. § 9.5 (1986). This section states "Except as provided in para-
graph (c) of this section, an employee of the Department may not testify as an
expert or opinion witness for any party other than the United States in any legal
proceeding in which the United States is involved, but may testify as to facts." Id.
§ 9.5(a)(emphasis added).
'" See Hamilton, 1981, supra note 10, at 620-21; Hamilton, Appellate Practice,
supra note 10, at 251-53.
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This is the proper result. National Transportation
Safety Board decisions and contentions of the FAA's
counsel before the board indicate that both bodies at-
tempt to protect the individual involved, while still pro-
moting air safety. Although occasional decisions seem
harsh or unwarranted; 93 they constitute the great minor-
ity. However, public pressure may force the FAA to
change its procedures for enforcement of FARs in the
near future. Because of the deregulation of the airline in-
dustry in 1978, and the resulting lower ticket prices, air
travel has increased by nearly fifty percent since 1982.194
Because of the increasingly crowded airways, violations of
FARs that once presented only slight danger may now
prove catastrophic.195 The FAA may react to this increas-
ing threat to air safety by more vigorous enforcement
against alleged violators. The FAA's more vigorous en-
forcement may result in more certificate holders being un-
justly sanctioned unless the certificate holder, or his
attorney, is familiar with some aspects of the enforcement
procedure that they may use to their advantage.
First, the FAA's administrative law judges and the
NTSB put great weight on the attitude of an alleged viola-
tor. The simplest tactic for a certificate holder under FAA
investigation is to be as cooperative as possible. In using
"" E.g., David L. Eby, I N.T.S.B. 614 (1977) (NTSB suspended Eby's commer-
cial pilot certificate for flying his agriculture plane at altitudes of 80 to 90 feet over
a small subdivision adjacent to a wheat field he was spraying); Reid N. Carlson, I
N.T.S.B. 1699 (1979) (NTSB suspended Carlson's ATP certificate for 15 days
when he misunderstood, and taxied contrary to, instructions from ground con-
trol). These cases may be examples of seemingly harsh sanctions, however, there
may also have been circumstances not contained in the opinions which influenced
the NTSB's decisions.
'0 Magnuson, Be Careful Out There, TIME, Jan. 12, 1987, graph at 29.
1o5 The Aug. 31, 1985 collision of a DC-9 and a single engine Piper over Cer-
ritos, California was caused in part by the Piper straying 500 feet into the Los
Angeles International Airport's Terminal Control Area in violation of 14 C.F.R.
§ 91.90(a)(1) (1987). Other factors besides crowded airways are also making
compliance with FARs more important. These factors include less experienced
pilots being hired by the airlines due to increase in demand for pilots, less exper-
ienced traffic controllers due to the 1980 Air Traffic Controllers strike, and older
aircraft flown by airlines in response to increased price competition after deregu-
lation. Magnuson, supra note 194, at 26-29.
this tactic however, the alleged violator should remember
that information he gives to the FAA may be used against
him. 1 96 Nevertheless, an alleged violator who projects the
image of an airman who recognizes the seriousness of the
FARs and wishes to work with the FAA to work out any
problems, has gone a long way toward settling the
conflict.
Second, an attorney handling an FAA enforcement case
should keep in mind that hearsay evidence is admissible in
Air Safety Proceedings.1 97 It may be much easier for an
attorney to prove extenuating circumstances explaining
the violation using testimony about radio and other con-
versations. This evidence would not be admissible if the
hearsay rule functioned.
Third, an alleged violator and his attorney should re-
member that they may use circumstantial evidence as
proof in an enforcement action. 198 This may be important
for two reasons. First, an alleged violator should consider
whether there will be adequate circumstantial evidence to
prove that he did violate the FAR. If the FAA will be able
to present that evidence, it may be in the alleged violator's
best interest to admit the violation in his initial contact
with the FAA. Then, the alleged violator will be able to
present all facts which justified the violation without con-
cern that the facts he presents will be used to prove the
FAA's case. Also, this would certainly allow the violator
to appear cooperative. Secondly, the probative value of
circumstantial evidence may be valuable to an alleged vio-
lator in an enforcement action to prove innocence or ex-
tenuating circumstances.
Finally, knowledge of the steps and procedures in an
enforcement action, are advantageous for an alleged vio-
lator. By knowing how the FAA will go about its investi-
gation and enforcement action an alleged violator can
prepare to present his case or rebut the FAA's. A knowl-
- See supra note 37-42 and accompanying text.
197 See supra note 184-191 and accompanying text.
,m; See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
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edge of the procedures involved in an FAA enforcement
action might also remind an airman (a potential alleged
violator) of the seriousness of the FARs, and lead to
greater caution. The result will be safer air travel; the
FARs and the FAA will have done their job well.
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APPENDIX A




Hr. John D. Smith
1711 Colorado Avenue
River City, Iowa 51649
Dear Hr. Smith:
Personnel of this office are investigating an incident occurring on July 4,
1979, which involved the operation of Cessna aircraft M57785 in th1e vicinity
of City Park at approximately 3:15 p.m.
The aircraft was observed and identified as Cessna M57785 diving on pic-
nickers and bathers from 3:15 to 3:35 p.m. We were informed that Cessna
N57785, piloted by you, landed at the airport at 3:45 p.m. Operation of
this type is contrary to the Federal Aviation Regulations.
This letter is to inform you that this matter is under investigation by the
Federal Aviation Administration. We would appreciate receiving any evidence
or statements you cight care to make regardihg this matter within 10 days of
receipt of this letter. Any discussion or written statements furnished by
you will be given consideration in our investigation. If we do not hear
from you within the specified time, our report will be processed without the
benefit of your statement.
Sincerely,
JOHN L. DOE
G-ineral Aviation Operations Inspector, GADO-4
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Los Angeles, California 90009
Dear W . Smith:
On October 20, 1979, you were the pilot in ccmand of a Beech Baron N13697
that entered the City Airport traffic pattern and landed at the airport
without maintaining radio carTmunications with the airport traffic ontrol
tower.
After a' discussion with you concerning this flight and your demonstrated
effort to adequately familiarize yourself with the local air traffic rules
pertaining to City Airport, w have concluded that the matter does not
warrant legal enforcement. In lieu of such action, we are issuing this
letter which will be made a matter of record. We will expect your future
cupliance with the regulations.
Sincerely,
JORT J. FRANK
Chief, Van Nuys GAMO
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APPEIDIX D







This letter is in regard to your operation as pilot in comiand of Cessna
180 N24689 on May 2, 1979.
On that date you flew from City Airport to Bron Field and returned to City
Airport. Available facts and information indicate that without prior
permission you flew through a restricted area over the Midtown Atomic Energy
Plant during this trip, whrich is contrary to the provisions of FAR 91.95.
As a result of our discussion of this incident, you agreed to receive addi-
tional instruction before May 30, 1979. We u-xderstand that you have
received 4 hours of ground school instruction in eap reading and
cross-country flight planning frcm a certificated flight instructor.
In closing this case, we have given consideration to all available facts and
concluded that the matter does not warrant legal enforcenent. In lieu of
such action, we are issuing this letter which will be rade a ratter of
record. We will expect your future compliance with the regulations.
Sincerely,
SAM B. EARLY
Chief, ATL GADO
Casenotes and
Statute Notes

